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JOHN D. LESHY*

Mining
1 Law Reform Redux, Once
More
On May tenth of this year, The New York Times marked the 130th
anniversary of the venerated or vilified-take your pick-Mining Law of
1872 with an editorial. The Times minced no words: Its editorial was titled
"A Bad Law's Birthday," and it called the law a "destructive relic."
The Times noted that the Bush Administration had "suggested"
reform. This was an overstatement. The Administration has mentioned an
interest in the idea, but it has not submitted, nor apparently does it intend
to submit, a concrete reform proposal to the Congress. Its actions speak
louder. As described in more detail below, the Administration has moved
aggressively to placate the industry by weakening or abandoning Clinton
Administration initiatives to reform the Mining Law's implementation.
While calls for reforming the Mining Law have been around almost
as long as the law itself, achieving it has been elusive. Still, hope springs
eternal. As the embers of reform are once again being poked, it is useful to
take another look at the subject, especially because the issues involved have
changed in some fundamental ways in recent years.
I. THE MINING LAW-A THUMBNAIL SKETCH 2
The Mining Law of 1872 is the last important surviving remnant of
nineteenth century federal land policy. Although its scope has been sharply
limited and its operation greatly modified by subsequent legislation, much
of the law's basic architecture remains in place. Meanwhile, its companions
in the great westward movement-the homestead acts, the railroad land
grants, and all the rest-have long since been repealed.
Though diminished in scope, the Mining Law still applies to many
important so-called "hardrock" minerals like gold, silver, copper,
molybdenum, lead, zinc, and uranium. And it still applies to hundreds of
millions of acres of federal land, mostly managed by the Bureau of Land
Management and the U.S. Forest Service. Where such lands are not
withdrawn from the operation of the Mining Law by executive or legislative
action, they remain open to exploration and development by persons who
locate mining claims for such minerals. These mining claims may ripen into
private property interests and, if the claimant complies with applicable
federal (and, to some extent, state and local) regulations, may be developed
without paying the United States any royalty. The law also authorizes the
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mining claimant to gain fee simple title to the land and the minerals (the socalled "patent" provision, in public lands parlance) for a nominal payment
of either $2.50 or $5.00 per acre. Since 1994, however, Congress has annually
legislated a moratorium on new applications for patents (explained further
below).
II. A CAPSULE HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS
In what might be called Reform Phase I (from about 1880 until the
1960s), reform advocates were found within the mining industry itself.
Larger, more sophisticated companies sought relaxation of the numerous
limitations the Mining Law placed on location and use of mining claims.
These limitations (most of which are still in effect today) forbade claim
location until discovery, limited the size of individual claims, and required
different types of claims to be located for various purposes. They all
complicated claim location and maintenance and provided the companies
little security during the search for viable mineral deposits.
The smaller prospectors stoutly opposed what they saw as an
attempt by the big operators to throw them off the public lands. Still, the
problems raised by the claim limitations combined with Progressive-Era
opposition to the giveaway of public resources to persuade Congress to
remove important minerals from the Mining Law in 1920. After enactment
of the Mineral Leasing Act that year, the petroleum and fertilizer minerals
on federal lands could be made available to industry only by lease, in the
discretion of the government, and the industry had to pay a royalty on
production.
Reform Phase II (from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s) was
sparked by the modern environmental movement. Reformers generally
advocated putting hardrock mining under a leasing system comparable to
the Mineral Leasing Act, with leasing being discretionary, all mineral
activity subject to thorough environmental regulation, and miners paying
a royalty. In response, the hardrock industry closed ranks, papered over its
differences, and presented a united front to defend what it liked to call its
"Magna Carta." Reform was supported across a broad spectrum (including
both the Nixon and Carter Administrations); yet, while numerous bills were
introduced, none passed either house of Congress.
But the reformers did make some headway. As part of a
comprehensive overhaul of the public land laws, the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) directed the Secretary of the Interior
to "prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands" and
made clear that this applied to hardrock mineral activity.3 In 1980, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) took modest steps toward fulfilling this
obligation with its first-ever regulations to attempt to control the
environmental effects of hardrock mining on BLM public lands. (The Forest
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Service had done the same on national forests a few years earlier, belatedly
implementing the authority that Congress had given it in 1897 to safeguard
the forests "from destruction." 4) FLPMA also required systematic planning
on the public lands and strengthened the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to withdraw federal lands from the operation of the Mining Law.
Reform Phase Ill began in the late 1980s. Reformers in Congress,
with the acquiescence of environmentalists,,backed off advocating a leasing
system. Reluctantly agreeing to maintain the framework of the claim
location system, they sought to (a) end patenting, (b) require a royalty on
production, (c) strengthen the ability to designate some federal lands
unsuitable for hardrock mining, and (d) toughen regulation of hardrock
mining activities to protect the environment. The industry continued to
resist any reform, although more moderate elements sought,
unsuccessfully, to find common ground with the environmental interests.
Congress took another reform step in 1992. Without fanfare it
adopted legislation that, for the first time, required each claimant holding
more than ten claims to pay a $100 fee each year to hold each claim. This
requirement was initially in effect for only two years but was renewed by
Congress in 1993,1998, and again in 2001, and currently runs through 2003.1
In 1994, with the reform-minded Clinton Administration in office,
and Democrats still in control of both houses of Congress, comprehensive
legislative reform came tantalizingly close to success. For the first time since
1872, both the House and the Senate passed Mining Law reform bills. The
House's version was a sweeping measure that would have ended patenting,
installed comprehensive environmental controls, and levied an eight
percent royalty on production. The Senate's version was a skeletal bill,
largely devoid of substance, that was merely a "ticket to conference" with
the House. The two versions could not be reconciled before the 103rd
Congress adjourned in October 1994.
That same month, however, Congress took another reform step.
The industry's ability to obtain patents (fee simple title to federal land and
minerals) for a token payment had long been the most notorious and most
indefensible feature of the Mining Law. Responding to Secretary Babbitt's
effective lampooning of the patent feature in widely publicized events,
Congress began a practice (which it has followed ever since) of including,
in the annual Interior Appropriations bill, a moratorium on accepting new
patent applications and issuing new patents. The halt has not been absolute;
Congress has allowed continued processing of a few hundred patent
applications that were well along in the pipeline. (As this is being written,
fewer than 75 applications in the pipeline remain to be processed.)
With the Republicans winning control of Congress in the fall of
1994, the political landscape shifted on Mining Law reform, as it did on
practically everything else. This sharp turn to the right led to several years
of sparring between the Administration and. the Congress. It began when
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the industry's congressional allies, in a fit of hubris, pushed a token reform
effort through the Congress. The cosmetic changes made by this "reform"
(some of which are discussed further below) were a transparent attempt to
deflect efforts toward meaningful reform. The reform was included in a
giant "omnibus budget reconciliation bill" that was sent to the President at
the end of 1995. The President vetoed it, objecting, among other things, to
what the conservation groups took to calling "sham Mining Law reform."
When the dust died down from this episode, the Clinton Administration
proceeded to pursue administrative reforms, addressed in the next section.
IlL. THE REFORM LANDSCAPE TODAY
The debate over reforming the Mining Law continues to evolve.
Over the last decade, the reform agenda has disaggregated into discrete
parts, and the fundamental issues have changed somewhat. Through it all,
the industry has yielded ground very grudgingly. It has shown a
remarkable ability to defend positions and to deflect criticisms that have
brought other heavy industries to heel in battles with environmentalists.
Nevertheless, it remains on the defensive.
A. Patenting
Officially, the battle over patenting has not ended. Congress must
renew the moratorium every year in the statute appropriating funds to the
Department of the Interior. But the reformers now have the high ground.
Unlike most other Mining Law issues, the patenting giveaway is easily
explained and understood. The industry's claim that it needs patents to
provide security for its investments founders on the fact that it has for many
decades invested billions of dollars in mines on unpatented mining claims.
Indeed, the patent Secretary Babbitt issued to American Barrick in May 1994
(the event that precipitated Congress's decision to institute a moratorium
on patenting a few months later) came after Barrick had invested a cool one
billion dollars in the mine.
Any attempt to abandon this annual practice would bring
unwanted negative publicity to the industry and its congressional allies.
Nothing excites journalists (or moderate eastern Republican members of
Congress) like the patent issue, and nothing would advance the cause of
comprehensive reform so much as an attempt by industry and its allies to
try to lift the moratorium.
The Bush Administration has not publicly opposed the moratorium,
but it has made the patenting process easier for companies. Prior to the
Clinton Administration, patent decisions had been made at a very low level
in the BLM, without much legal or policy review for consistency. One of
Bruce Babbitt's first moves upon becoming Secretary was to create a new
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process, with multiple reviews, for examining patent applications. He also
stopped a program that had allowed mining companies to pay for the
preparation of mineral reports. These reports made the crucial
determination whether the company was entitled to a patent. Babbitt's new
review process was upheld in court.6
The Bush Administration has resumed allowing mining companies
to pay for mineral reports and has delegated the patent decision back down
the chain of command as far as the Director of the BLM.7 This retreat is so
far only applicable to those patent applications that were grandfathered
from the congressional moratorium.
True to form, the industry has not conceded the patent issue
entirely. It still favors renewed patenting, but now says it is willing to pay
fair market value for the surface of federal lands it would acquire; that is,
"exclusive of and without regard to the mineral deposits in the [federal]
land or the use of the land for mineral activities."' There is, as Mae West
supposedly said, less here than meets the eye. The industry is still not
willing to pay much of anything for the federally-owned minerals. Their
value of course dwarfs the value of the land sans minerals.
Moreover, the industry also is willing to give the government the
opportunity, after the patent issues and the minerals have been extracted,
to reacquire the land." At that point, if history is any guide, the land would
be permanently scarred and, in many cases, a continuing source of water
and air pollution. The industry appears to want, in other words, to have its
cake and eat it too-to get title to the minerals for nothing, and then to
saddle the government with long-term cleanup responsibility. To this
observer, the industry's position brings to mind the classic definition of
"chutzpah," where a person who murders his parents seeks mercy on the
ground he is an orphan.
One could, however, make a respectable case for renewing
patenting in narrow circumstances, as follows: Many modem mining
operations are found on, or proposed for, lands that are in a hodgepodge
of ownerships. Some of the lands are private (having been previously
patented under the Mining Law, homestead acts, railroad land grants or
other federal disposal laws). Some is state-owned (remnants of school trust
and other federal land grants to states). And some of it is federal land.
Is there any justification for the United States continuing to hold
pieces of federal land in such situations? I can think of two. The first is the
future prospect of gaining royalty payments for the federal minerals
extracted from such lands. If the United States were to be paid a suitable
amount for such minerals, through a royalty payment on production or
otherwise, this justification disappears. The second is that continuing
federal ownership furnishes a basis for federal environmental regulation of
the mine. This justification is not compelling, because the United States
could, if it chose to do so, impose environmental regulation on purely
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private mines under the commerce clause,' just as it has for surface coal
mining throughout the United States in the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 10
Privatizing such remnant pieces of federal lands was seriously
discussed with some mine operators toward the end of the Clinton
Administration. The specific proposal was to exchange pieces of federal
land on which mining claims had been located (found within both
operating and proposed mines) for nonfederal land elsewhere. Mine
operators sought title in order to gain exemption from any royalty Congress
might impose in the future and to simplify regulatory requirements, since
after the exchange they would have to answer only to one regulator (the
state) rather than two. The United States was attracted to the idea because
it would convert the value left in these remnant federal interests into land
with conservation value, such as habitat for endangered species.
Although conceptually attractive, such proposals never advanced
very far. For one thing, the valuation issues were challenging. What is an
unpatented mining claim that supports an operating mine worth to the
federal government when no royalty is currently authorized by law? The
answer would seem to depend in part on the prospect that Congress might
at some point enact a royalty that could recapture for the federal treasury
some of the value of the minerals on these pieces of land. Fixing the value
requires considerable speculation. The valuation difficulty is compounded
where the mining company seeks to acquire title to an undeveloped mineral
deposit (as opposed to an active mine). Beyond valuation, there was also a
serious question whether a land exchange- which in effect patented the
claimed land to the mining company-would be an unauthorized evasion
of the congressional moratorium against new patents.
Before leaving the patent issue, two other things deserve mention.
One is an exemplar of the tenderness with which the Department of the
Interior has often treated mining claims. In the Wilderness Act of 1964,
Congress decided that henceforth patents of mining claims in designated
wilderness areas should convey only the minerals, and not the surface. This
decision was, however, subject to "valid existing rights."" Without legal
analysis, the Department long acted as if the valid existing right contained
a right to the surface of unpatented mining claims as well as the minerals
where a discovery had been made before the land had been designated as
wilderness. We wrote a Solicitor's opinion explaining that valid existing
rights did not include a right to patent the surface."2 So far the Bush
Administration has acted consistently with that Opinion. 3
The second practice exemplified the sloppiness that had
characterized much administration of the Mining Law. Whether a
"discovery" of a "valuable mineral deposit" exists, and thus whether a
patent may be issued, depends upon whether the mineral is "marketable."
This in turn depends on, among other things, the market price for the
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mineral. But the market price of many minerals has historically fluctuated,
sometimes quite dramatically. The price of gold, for example-the most
widely sought mineral subject to the Mining Law-has ranged from about
$250 to $850 per ounce over the last twenty years. A key question in
determining discovery, then, is what moment or period of time is selected
to calculate the market price.
Rather amazingly, the Department had traditionally provided its
mineral examiners (those responsible for preparing validity determinations)
little guidance on this issue. Consequently, examiners made ad hoc
decisions about what commodity price to use. Predictably, practice varied
widely. To make the Department's patent review more consistent, the BLM
finally adopted a specific policy on this issue in 1998."' Where the mineral
in question has widely reported market prices and is subject to "futures"
trading based on project future market prices, mineral examiners are to use
a market price averaged over a three-year period on either side of the date
the discovery determination is made. So far the Bush Administration has
not re-examined this approach.
B. Claimholding Limitations
This has two different elements. The first is the $100 rental or claim
maintenance fee, mentioned above, which was adopted by Congress in
1992. Although this fee must also be periodically renewed, and some in the
industry would like to see the fee reduced (or the number of claims to
qualify for an exemption enlarged), large production companies like (or
don't really mind paying) the fee. Its main effect has been to drastically
reduce the number of recorded claims, from well over a million in the 1980s
to about 200,000 at the end of Fiscal Year 2000. Before the fee was imposed,
claims were nearly costless to hold, 5 giving the less scrupulous great
incentive to locate them without any intention of mining, in order to be paid
by those who had such intention. This cottage industry has withered
because of the claim holding fee. This has simplified the task of assembling
lands for a proposed mine. The government also likes the fee because the
proceeds are dedicated to the administration of the Mining Law. For these
reasons, the holding fee is well on its way to becoming entrenched, though
further action by Congress is required to make it permanent.
The second, and more important, element of claimholding has to
do with the Mining Law's most archaic feature: The fact that it creates
different kinds of claims, with specific limits on the characteristics and area
of land they can include. There are two different kinds of mineral claims
(lode and placer) and one kind of nonmineral claim (mill sites). To further
confuse things, the Mining Law also authorizes the location of so-called
tunnel sites, but the courts have deemed these to be rights-of-way.1 6 The law
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has also long been applied to limit the numbers of certain kinds of claims
that can be held.
The line between the two kinds of mineral claims is drawn on the
basis of the characteristics of the mineral deposit. But of course nature does
not always draw neat lines, making determinations about which kind of
claim to locate difficult. The Supreme Court has noted that a "placer
discovery will not sustain a lode location, nor a lode discovery a placer
location." 7 This leads prudent mining companies to locate both kinds of
claims where the circumstances are ambiguous, as they often are. But
there's another catch: If the claims are located in the wrong order (because
one type of claim can be abandoned by locating another type of claim on
top of it) the claims are still void. As I have previously observed, "[tihese
contortions serve absolutely no useful purpose." 8
Still, this is just an annoyance. Other claim problems are more
serious. Perhaps the most notorious is the provision of the Mining Law that
authorizes the location of nonmineral claims called mill sites, for the
purpose of accommodating mineral processing and ancillary facilities on
federal lands. The Mining Law limits mill sites to five acres and requires
them to be noncontiguous to mining claims. They must also be located on
nonmineral federal land open to the Mining Law.
Each of these requirements puts an awkward burden on miners.
The claim size limit is especially problematic. Modem mining requires large
acreages for processing facilities and tailings and waste rock piles. In typical
contemporary cyanide heap-leach mining of widely disseminated gold
deposits, hundreds of tons of material must be moved to produce ounces
of gold.
The Mining Law has long been interpreted to limit mill sites to one
per each (lode or placer) mineral claim. Although this interpretation had
sometimes been departed from in practice (without any attempt to justify
it under the terms of the law), I issued a Solicitor's Opinion in 1997
concluding that this limitation was still valid. 9 The effect is that, in typical
large-scale operations, mining companies can acquire larger acreages of
federal land they desire for tailings and waste rock piles only through a
land exchange or other means.
In policy terms, the effect is to give the government more control
over such mining operations, because these alternative ways of gaining
access to federal land for such purposes require the exercise of unfettered
discretion by the government. Where a mining company needs more
federal land for a mining operation than the mill site limitation allows, the
company comes to the government in the same legal posture as a timber
company, an oil and gas company, or a camper or other user of federal
land. It is entitled to no special favors.
The industry's preferred reading of the Mining Law is to give it an
unqualified right to gain access to as much federal land as necessary in
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order to bring a deposit into production. This would mean, for example,
that if a single, 20-acre mining claim contains a mineral that available
technology requires 10,000 acres to process, the Mining Law allows the
claimant to locate and use 2000 mill sites for that purpose, regardless of
whether the government thinks it is an appropriate use of the land. The
Solicitor's Opinion explains why this reading is not consistent with
longstanding published interpretations of the Law.
The industry's response to the Mill Site Opinion has been to contest
this interpretation everywhere except, curiously, in the courts. The
conclusion seems inescapable that the industry is not very confident of
winning in court-that the vehemence of its rhetoric disguises a weak legal
position.
The industry first sought a fix from Congress through an
appropriation rider. In 1999 Congress provided a modicum of relief. It
included a rider that effectively exempted from the Mill Site Opinion "any
operation for which a plan of operations has been approved" prior to the
rider, or submitted to the BLM or the U.S. Forest Service prior to the date
of the Mill Site Opinion.' Anticipating a potential court test, the rider
cautioned that it should not "be construed as an explicit or tacit adoption,
ratification, endorsement, approval, rejection or disapproval of" the
Solicitor's opinion. Although the rider itself is not a paragon of clarity, the
Bush Administration has interpreted it liberally, to exempt "any later
revision, amendment or modification" of plans of operations approved
or submitted to federal agencies prior the date of the Mill
prior to the rider
21
Site Opinion.
Not satisfied with this limited victory, the industry has taken its
argument for unlimited access to federal lands back to the executive branch,
this time apparently finding more sympathetic ears in the Bush
Administration. As of this writing, the Administration is actively
reexamining the Mill Site Opinion.
The Mill Site Opinion remains a problem for proposed new mining
operations. Some mining companies have sought to skirt the mill site
limitation by using mineral claims for mill site purposes. I addressed this
practice in another Solicitor's Opinion adopted in early 2001.2 This Opinion
concluded that land within mining claims may be used for purposes
ancillary to mining on that claim, as well as for mineral extraction. It noted,
however, that if mining claims are used exclusively for ancillary purposes,
they may be invalid. This is because such use gives rise to an inference that
the mining claims being used this way do not contain valuable mineral
deposits. The inference is particularly reasonable if the miner intends to
bury the claimed land under thousands or millions of tons of tailings or
waste rock, rather than remove minerals from it. Therefore mining claims
used for such purposes (and operations dependent upon such use) are
subject to legal challenge.
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Other companies have tried to circumvent the mill site limitation
by "slicing and dicing" their mineral claims (e.g., dividing a single 20-acre
claim into 21-acre claims) and then arguing they are meeting the one mill
site per mineral claim standard. This strategem is also of dubious validity.'
Still other problems arise from the Mining Law's archaic claim
limitations. Many large mines operate on dozens or even hundreds of
mining claims. Courts have long insisted that miners must show a
discovery on each claim. But modem mining imperatives usually mean it
is not economic to extract minerals from a single claim. No court has
squarely addressed the legality of this modem practice.24
Relocating or amending mining claims after they are first located
is frequently necessary as an ore body is further identified and defined. An
arcane and complicated mixture of state and federal rules governs the
relocation or amendment process. Failure to navigate this thicket properly
can lead to the claims being voided. Where the federal land involved has
since been withdrawn from new claim location, whether the claim may be
amended or must instead be relocated could spell the difference between
life or death for new mine proposals. Environmentalists stand ready to
police compliance with these rules.'
I have previously capsulized the debate over these claim limitations this way:
The mill site imbroglio is emblematic of a larger issue:
namely, how to interpret this old Mining Law. Some
members of the mineral law community see the Mining Law
as almost infinitely flexible, so long as the flexibility runs in
one direction-to serve the interests and needs of the
domestic mining industry. [The Interior Department's]
perspective [that is, in the Clinton Administration] has been
different. Doubtless a basic purpose of the Mining Law was
to promote the development of federal minerals, but if the
enacting Congress had wanted the Executive Branch to bend
every effort toward that end, it needed to say nothing more
than that. As we all know, however, Congress instead chose
to include exquisite (or mind-numbing, depending upon your
perspective) details in the law. We concluded that Congress
did not intend the statutory mill site acreage limitation to be
ignored to give miners a right to claim (and patent) an
unlimited amount of public land acreage for waste dumps
and spoil piles.26
All told, the mill site and other claim limitations make it difficult to
assemble and maintain land positions for modem new mining operations.
Congress has acted to mitigate the effect of the mill site limitation on
existing mines, or mines that were pending approval in 1997. But it has left
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the limitation, as construed in these Solicitor's Opinions, in place for all new
operations.
Assuming the Administration reverses the Mill Site Opinion (a
reasonable assumption, given its so far boundless willingness to give this
industry what it wants), the industry will not be out of the woods. For one
thing, environmentalists stand ready to challenge any rollback in court and
could well succeed. Furthermore, the environmentalists will likely challenge
mining claims that are "sliced and diced" in order to avoid the limitation on
grounds of lack of discovery. And they could mount a similar challenge
where mining claims are used for mill site purposes.27
All this means that, absent legislative intervention, these limitations
on claims could be an Achilles heel for any attempt to open a new mine on
federal mining claims. If the courts refuse to accede to the industry's
demand for infinite flexibility, the burden of seeking reform of the Mining
Law will be shifted to the industry. This would fundamentally alter the
terms of the reform debate because, as explained in Part IV below, both
sides---environmentalists and their congressional allies, and industry and
its allies-currently have a veto power over any change.
In a legislative debate, some of these claim limitation issues will be
useful bargaining chips for environmental advocates. For example, there is
no particular environmental benefit to strictly enforcing the distinction
between lode and placer claims. But other issues, such as limiting the
amount of acreage to be used for waste dumps and tailings piles, are
important to environmentalists.
C. Royalty/Reclamation Fees
Compared to some of the other reform issues, this one is relatively
straightforward. Hardrock miners on the federal lands are among very few
hardrock miners on Planet Earth who do not pay the owner of the resource
a percentage of the value of production. Miners on state lands, on private
lands, and in most foreign countries routinely pay the owners a royalty. Not
so on federal land.
This is because "free minerals," like "free soil," was a powerful cry
in the nineteenth century and proved sufficient to carry the day for miners
in the post-Civil War drive to settle the West as rapidly as possible. Even
then, some observers saw the risk of giving the miners the minerals for free.
Army Colonel Mason, who toured the gold fields of the Sierra Nevada
foothills in California as the California gold rush was just getting underway,
reported that he engaged in "serious reflection" about how the government
ought to extract a fee from the miners. But prudence won out: "[U]pon
considering the large extent of country, the character of the people engaged,
and the small scattered force at my command [indeed, many of his soldiers
had deserted to look for gold], I resolved not to interfere." That was
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probably a good thing. But Mason also issued an eerily prophetic warning:
"[Sitill the Government is entitled to rents for this land, and immediate
steps should be devised to collect them, for the longer it is delayed the more
difficult it will become."'
Today, campers on BLM and national forest land, like visitors to
national parks and wildlife refuges, livestock graziers, coal and oil and gas
producers, telecommunications site operators, and timber harvesters all pay
fees to extract or otherwise use the resources of the federal lands. The
exemption enjoyed by hardrock miners is ever more glaring and ever more
difficult to sustain. The industry itself now concedes as much. In the last
few years it is now willing to support a royalty, so long as the rate is set
very low and it is generously larded with deductions, exemptions, and
grandfather clauses.
A royalty is generally assumed to require legislation. As with the
tax code, the devil is very much in the details. The royalty rate, expressed
as a percentage of value of production, tends to attract the most political
attention. For comparison's sake, under the Mineral Leasing Act, miners of
federal coal recovered by surface mining pay a minimum of twelve and
one-half percent royalty; producers of federal oil and gas the same;
producers of federal phosphate pay not less than five percent.29 The
hardrock mining industry pays private or state mineral owners an average
royalty of something over four percent, although some go as high as
eighteen percent. 3°
At least as important as the rate, however, is what the royalty is
levied on (gross versus net value of production or, more precisely, what
kinds of deductions for what costs are allowed to arrive at the value of
production upon which the royalty is calculated). The federal coal royalty
is levied on "the value of coal as defined by regulation"; the oil and gas
royalty is on the "amount or value of the production"; the phosphate
royalty is on the "gross value of the output."
Also important is the scope of any grandfather clause or phase-in.
There are relatively few major mines, and some produce minerals for a
century or more. New mines are opened infrequently (low gold prices in
recent years have been a major factor in very few new mines opening in the
United States). Thus, a permanent exemption for existing mines would rob
a royalty of much meaning for a long time.
Industry understands this, of course. The industry's "sham reform"
bill vetoed by President Clinton in early 1996 included a five percent royalty
on the "net proceeds" of mineral production. But it also contained a
detailed and lengthy list of deductions, as well as a grandfather clause that
would have exempted not only all existing, active mines, but also could
exempt most or all mines that might ever open on all existing mining
claims." The latter widens a large loophole into a chasm, for the industry
has long had a penchant for hoarding and maintaining mining claims that

Summer 2002]

MINING LAW REFORM

might be valuable at some time in the future. It was not surprising
(although it was bitterly resisted by the Republicans, who sought to squelch
the report) that the Congressional Budget Office concluded that the royalty
in this "reform" bill would generate very little revenue for the federal
treasury from this multi-billion dollar industry.
It is, on the other hand, not unreasonable to protect, to some extent,
the ability of existing mines to continue to operate without paying a royalty,
at least for some reasonable transition period. Although the industry is fond
of expressing the argument to exempt existing mines from a royalty in
constitutional terms, there is no serious constitutional question involved.
The matter is political, not constitutional, but of course politics counts,
especially in a political institution like the Congress. How to handle existing
mining claims was the principal factor delaying enactment of the Mineral
Leasing Act for a decade. 2
The hardrock industry also argues that a royalty will put it out of
business. It points to the historic wide fluctuations in the market price of
metals, the most important hardrock minerals. This argument conveniently
ignores the fact that all federal mineral royalty provisions now on the
books, and all those in Mining Law reform bills, authorize the Secretary to
suspend royalties when ongoing operations are operating at a loss.3" That
has not been enough for the industry. Characteristically, it wants special,
favorable treatment.
Another form of monetary recovery has sometimes been proposed.
This is a "reclamation fee," similar to that levied under the Surface Mining
Reclamation and Control Act of 1977, the landmark federal coal surface
mining statute.' A reclamation fee in the hardrock context would capture
for the federal treasury some value from mineral production from state and
private land (much of the latter being land that was probably patented
under the Mining Law of 1872), as well as federal land. The reclamation fee
is in the nature of a tax rather than a royalty, because it is not based on the
United States owning title to the mineral. It could be combined with, or
levied in place of, a royalty.
In the end, arguments over a royalty and reclamation fee are only
over money. The amount involved is not trivial, though it is not Pentagonscale either. According to one estimate, hardrock minerals worth nearly $1.5
billion are removed from the federal lands each year. A four percent royalty
would produce on the order of $60 million per year. Looking at it another
way, domestic gold production from all lands, not just federal lands, has
averaged about 11,000 ounces per year, for a total value of $3.3 billion at
$300 per ounce. A reclamation fee of three percent would produce nearly
$100 million per year. For comparison's sake, the federal government takes
in several billion dollars per year in bonus bids, royalties, and rentals from
the coal and oil and gas industries operating on federal lands.'
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The hardrock industry has recognized it can no longer politically
defend such a unique exception, when the result is that a family engaged
in recreational camping on federal land pays the United States more than
operators of billion-dollar mines. Still, there will have to be hard bargaining
over how much the miners will pay and how the royalty and/or fee is
phased in.
D. Abandoned Mine Lands Cleanup
Modern proposals to levy a royalty and/or reclamation fee earmark
the proceeds to clean up land previously mined under the Mining Law that
went unreclaimed and abandoned. Many of these abandoned mine sites
pose safety problems and are continuing sources of pollution.
There is considerable variation in estimates of number of problem
sites and the estimated cleanup costs, but overall the dimensions of the
problem are rather staggering. Estimates of abandoned mines on federal
land range into the many hundreds of thousands; EPA puts the figure at
over 200,0006 More than 25 individual sites are on the Environmental
Protection Agency's Superfund list. A 1998 federal survey found more than
30 mining sites in the West to present an "imminent hazard" to public
health and the environment. EPA officials have estimated that 40 percent
of the watersheds in the West are affected by mining pollution.' Another
estimate is that 16,000 miles of western streams are polluted by hardrock
mines. The amount of mining waste flowing from the Silver Valley into
Coeur D'Alene Lake in Northern Idaho has been estimated at 70 million
tons, which if piled up on a football field would rise 4.7 miles above the
earth's surface.'
Earmarking federal revenues from a hardrock royalty or
reclamation fee to clean up abandoned polluting mines is a straightforward
idea. Viewed independently, it should command widespread political
support. The industry in the main does not shirk from the idea of a cleanup
program. The states would welcome it, especially if they get a piece of the
action and some or all of the administrative responsibility to carry it out.
Cleaning up the mess is a good idea, and it is not inappropriate to secure
the necessary funds from the industry that created it in the first place. The
cost estimates for such a cleanup run to many billions of dollars (upwards
of $35 billion, according to the pro-reform Mineral Policy Center). The size
of these estimates raises an interesting question: Has, in the end, the
hardrock mining in the West been worth it? Would an objective cost-benefit
analysis (if there were such a thing) show that the value of minerals
extracted exceeded the costs of repairing the damage caused to the
environment?
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E. Environmental Regulation
Here the issues are the most complex, and may be the most
intractable. But here too the reform landscape has changed substantially in
the past few years, especially on the public lands managed by the Bureau
of Land Management. (Regulations applying to hardrock mining on
national forests have changed little over that period. 9)
The starting point has already been mentioned: A major, though
somewhat camouflaged, provision Congress included in section 302(b) of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. It mandated that the
Secretary of the Interior shall, "by regulation or otherwise, take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the [public]
lands." Congress left no doubt that this directive applied to activities
carried out under the Mining Law of 1872, albeit in a left-handed way.'
1. The OriginalPart3809 Regulations
The Secretary responded with regulations promulgated in late 1980
that regulated hardrock mining activities on public lands to protect the
environment. These regulations, which came to be known as the Part 3809
regulations (because that's where they were found in volume 43 of the Code
of Federal Regulations), contained some major loopholes. For one thing,
they exempted from advance approval all mining operations that disturbed
fewer than five acres of public land.4 Operators of these so-called "notice
mines" merely had to notify the BLM. The burden was on the BLM to
ensure that these operations met environmental good housekeeping
standards. If they did not, the burden was on the BLM to bring a lawsuit
against the operator and make its case for compliance to a federal court. The
BLM hardly ever, if ever, went to the trouble of doing that. The "notice"
loophole was substantial; over the years from 1981 to 2000, the BLM
received between 558 and 2451 notices each year.42 The BLM also
categorically exempted the "notice" mines from the otherwise nearuniversal environmental impact assessment requirement of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 4'
The 3809 regulations required mines disturbing more than five
acres" to obtain advance approval from the BLM of proposed plans of
operations. From 1981 to 2000, between 149 and 575 plans of operations
were approved each year.' The need for BLM approval triggered NEPA
requirements, although the BLM was slow to engage in full environmental
impact statement preparation on such proposals.
The second major loophole in the original 3809 regulations was that
they did not flatly require operators to provide the BLM with financial
assurance (such as bonding requirements) to insure that disturbed mine
sites would be reclaimed to protect the environment in the event of operator
default. Furthermore, they were vague on what would satisfy the financial
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assurance requirements- whether an actual performance bond had to be
posted, or whether "self-bonding" (which has been aptly described as
"taking the operator's word for its financial soundness") was sufficient.
A third shortcoming of the original 3809 regulations was their
failure to provide administrative penalties for violations. This meant that
violations could only be sanctioned by taking operators to court, a
cumbersome process that required Interior to persuade the Department of
Justice to set aside other priorities to undertake the necessary litigation. As
a result, enforcement actions were rare.
Fourth, they lumped together the Department's obligations to
protect against "unnecessary" and "undue" degradation of the public lands
from hardrock mining activities. The statute seems clearly to make these
separate obligations, because it links them with the disjunctive "or." The
regulations blurred the two by defining the degradation standard this way:
Unnecessary or undue degradation means surface
disturbances greater than what would normally result when
an activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator in
usual, customary, and proficient operations of similar
character and taking into consideration the effects of
operations on other resources and land uses, including those
resources and uses outside the area of operations. Failure to
initiate and complete reasonable mitigation measures,
including reclamation of disturbed areas or creation of a
nuisance may constitute unnecessary or undue degradation.
Failure to comply with applicable environmental protection
statutes and regulations thereunder will constitute
unnecessary or undue degradation. Where specific statutory
authority requires the attainment of a stated level of
protection or reclamation, such as in the California Desert
46
Conservation Area.. .that level of protection shall be met.
2. Upgradingthe 3809 Regulations
Despite their shortcomings, the regulations were better than what
came before, which was no regulations at all. The Department recognized
from the beginning, however, that its first foray into the regulatory arena
would need reexamination, and it promised to review the new regulations
within three years of promulgation. That did not happen (it was the first
Reagan term, after all). By the end of the Reagan Administration, however,
General Accounting Office reports and congressional and public criticism
had prompted the Department to undertake an inquiry into whether the
regulations should be overhauled. This ripened, in the first Bush
Administration, into an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that
formally kicked off the upgrading process.
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The Clinton Administration put this effort on hold while it worked
with Congress to try to achieve legislative reform of the Mining Law. In
January 1997, when it became clear that agreement on statutory reform was
not possible, the Administration revived the 3809 reform rulemaking. It
took four years to complete, mostly because it required working through
numerous obstacles in the form of Interior Appropriation Act riders, which
were thrown in the path of completion by the industry and its congressional
allies. Riders were adopted that required more consultation with the states
and creation of a National Research Council (NRC) panel to report on the
operation of the existing rules. The last and most significant rider required
any new rules to be "not inconsistent with the recommendations contained
in the National Research Council (NRC) report entitled HardrockMining on
Federal Lands.47 The NRC's 1999 report contained sixteen specific
recommendations for improving the Department's regulation of hardrock
mining activities.'
3. Making the NRC Recommendations Substantive Law
Unlike most appropriation riders, which expire at the end of the
year for which the appropriations are made, the last rider remains in effect
until Congress provides otherwise. That is because, by its own terms, the
rider applies to the expenditure of money appropriated not only by the
appropriations act which contains the rider, but also funds appropriated by
"any other Act." Effectively, then, the rider has laid the NRC recommendations over FLPMA's duty to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation."
For example, one of the NRC's recommendations was to eliminate
the "notice" mine loophole.49 The congressional rider converts this from a
blue-ribbon recommendation to substantive law. Because it forbade BLM
from promulgating new rules that were inconsistent with the recommendation, any new rules had to eliminate notice mines.
To take another example, the NRC's very first recommendation was
that all non-casual hardrock mining activities on federal lands should be
accompanied by "[flinancial assurance" to ensure "reclamation of disturbances to the environment." t' The NRC explained that cleanup costs
"should not be a public burden," and yet under the then-prevailing regime
there was "inadequate protection of the public and the environment. " " The
NRC's resolve was probably stiffened by a number of hardrock mining
company bankruptcies in the late 1990s, where company financial
assurances fell far short of the amount needed to cover the costs of
reclamation. 2
The rider combines with the NRC recommendation to create a
statutory floor for new rules that require the government to secure financial
assurance from companies engaging in hardrock mining activities under the
Mining Law of 1872. Thus having no choice in the matter, the Bush
Administration retained the Clinton Administration's financial assurance
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rule, except for a minor change to the deadlines by which operators had to
furnish financial guarantees.5
Of course, calculating cleanup costs for fixing financial assurance
obligations is hardly an exact science, especially in trying to accurately
predict the amount of water pollution a mine may cause, and what would
be necessary to clean it up. In some cases, it may be necessary to treat the
water permanently.
Even before the new rules took effect, state regulators were being
sensitized to the issue. Environmentalists helped by publishing a guide to
bonding practices to better educate state regulators to their responsibility.
The new rules themselves provided some specificity about the kinds of
financial assurances necessary to insure reclamation in the event of operator
default.' The federal rider, the NRC Report, and the new federal rules
should further stiffen regulators' backbones. There is some indication that
the tougher bonding requirements are having some impact on the ground.
In late 2001 New Mexico state regulators told Phelps Dodge it may have to
post a bond of nearly a billion dollars to cover the cost of closing and
reclaiming one of its large open pit copper mines. Some industry members
have spoken darkly of a bonding "crisis," brought on by a confluence of
unhappy events: Mining company bankruptcies, surety company bankruptcies, fewer companies issuing surety bonds, surety companies requiring
more collateral to obtain bonds, and government regulators getting tougher
(requiring higher bonds and no longer allowing corporations to selfinsure).' The financial assurance issue clouds the ability of industry to gain
approval for new operations.
In sum, the rider requiring consistency with the NRC recommendations has altered the reform landscape. By in effect giving the NRC
recommendations the force of law governing new 3809 regulations,
Congress has poured more "content into the "unnecessary or undue
degradation" standard, and thereby limited the Department's flexibility to
weaken rules the industry does not like.
4. Improvements Outside the NRC Recommendations
Where the NRC did not provide a specific recommendation, the
Department is still bound by the duty to prevent "unnecessary or undue
degradation." The NRC did not, for example, make any specific recommendation about the kinds of financial assurances that were appropriate. Under
the terms of the congressional rider, then, this left the Department to decide
what was needed to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation." Even
though the NRC did not specifically recommend against allowing operators
to "self bond," it did note that the financial assurance mechanism "should
be secure and sufficiently liquid to allow responses to near term needs."'
If the Department decides that self-bonding fails to prevent "unnecessary
or undue degradation," it has a duty to prohibit it.
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The Clinton Admiristration completed its overhaul of the new rules
in late 2000, carefully explaining in its preamble to the final rule why its
proposals were "not inconsistent with" the NRC recommendations. The
rules addressed a number of hardrock mining issues on which the NRC did
not make specific recommendations.
5. The "Right to Say No"
The most important of these was the inclusion of a "right to say no"
to new proposed plans of operations that threatened to cause "significant
irreparable harm to outstanding resources that could not be mitigated."
This standard, which riled the industry, was based upon a Solicitor's
7 The Opinion addressed -the Secretary's
Opinion issued in late 1999.%
authority over a proposed plan of operations for an open-pit, heap-leach
gold mine (the Glamis mine) on BLM land in the California Desert. The
mine was strongly opposed by the local Quechan Tribe of Indians, who
objected because it would obliterate a trail and other features of cultural
importance to the Tribe. The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
issued a report endorsing the Tribe's concern and recommending that the
proposed mine be denied, if the Secretary had authority to do so. The
Solicitor construed FLPMA §§ 601 (which applies only in the California
Desert, and which contains a "no undue impairment" standard) and 302(b)
(which contains the "unnecessary or undue degradation" standard,
applicable to all public lands), as giving the Secretary the authority to turn
down the proposed Glamis mine plan of operations.'
The Clinton Administration's new 3809 rules also contained
detailed performance standards, and provisions authorizing the Department to impose administrative penalties for noncompliance. The latter
followed the NRC's recommendation that federal land managers have
authority to issue administrative penalties for violations of regulatory
requirements, because this was necessary to provide a "credible and
expeditious means to secure compliance."'
6. Bush AdministrationRetreats
Almost immediately upon taking office, the Bush Administration
set about to roll back some key provisions of the Clinton reforms.' It issued
a new Solicitor's Opinion, which overruled the Glamis Opinion,1 and
issued new rules that watered down the Clinton rules in some key
respects. 62
The administrative penalty provisions were also stripped from the
reform measures. The rationale here was particularly interesting. The Bush
Administration explained that whether the Department has authority to
impose administrative penalties is "unsettled," and therefore it is "prudent
to await clear guidance from Congress." Perhaps more to the point, it
complained that if it defended the Clinton Administration position that it
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already had such authority, the industry would contest it in court, and
being sued by industry was something that, according to the Administration, ought to be "avoided by future legislation."' Curiously, although not
surprisingly, the Bush Administration to date has not submitted legislation
to Congress to obtain such authority. The inference one can readily draw is
that the Administration does not want the authority to issue administrative
penalties, despite the NRC recommendation, because it would rile the
industry.
The new Administration also weakened the performance standards,
narrowed the definition of "operator" to exclude references to parent
entities and affiliates, and removed a requirement that operators assume
joint and several liability for meeting reclamation standards. Most
significantly, it stripped out the "right to say no" based on a "substantial
irreparable harm" standard. Remarkably, it claimed that its "fundamental
goal" in crafting all these new policies was "to enhance the BLM's ability to
protect public health, public land resources, and the nation's taxpayers," for
Secretary Norton declared that she would "not support any proposal that
either jeopardized the environment or shifted the costs of reclamation of
mined lands to the public." 64 And it may not be through yet. In April 2002
it asked for more public comment on these rules, and may be considering
watering down the requirements still further.'
These regulatory retrenchments have been challenged by environmentalists in federal court in the District of Columbia. As of this writing,
motions for summary judgment are soon to be filed.
The litigation could provide a key test for how the Department's
responsibilities under FLPMA and the rider incorporating the NRC
recommendations are to be interpreted. The outcome could greatly
influence the future course of Mining Law reform in the executive and
legislative branches.
F. Mineral Withdrawals
During its eight years in office, the Clinton Administration
continued the long-term trend of withdrawing more and more federal land
from the operation of the Mining Law. Although the industry expresses
alarm at this, several hundred million acres remain open to the Mining Law.
The Clinton Administration withdrawals encompassed several million acres
in the nearly two dozen national monuments President Clinton proclaimed,
as well as the Rocky Mountain Front in Montana, the San Francisco Peaks
in Northern Arizona, the area around the site of the proposed Glamis Mine
in the California desert, the area along the northeastern boundary of
Yellowstone National Park, a 1.1 million acre tract in southwestern Oregon,
and other areas. The Yellowstone withdrawal was combined with a buyout
of the New World gold mine that was proposed on the site of an old mine
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near the Park. The San Francisco Peaks were withdrawn from new claim
location at the same time the federal government bought and phased out a
highly visible existing pumice mine in the area.
So far, the Bush Administration has rolled back only one of these
actions, reducing the Oregon withdrawal by 90 percent, from 1.1 million
acres to about 117,000 acres. The area contains a number of wild and scenic
rivers, and the mineral activity here is mostly recreational mining for gold
in streambeds. (Whether the Mining Law supports mineral activity being
conducted for recreational purposes is an interesting legal question.)
Environmental advocates claim the powerful suction dredges used threaten
endangered coho salmon spawning areas, although the miners and the
Forest Service dispute this. Given the Bush Administration's other efforts
on behalf of the industry in other areas, it would not be surprising to see
more withdrawn areas restored to the operation of the Mining Law. (On the
other hand, the Bush Administration has itself withdrawn about 183,000
acres from the operation of the Mining Law.)
G. The Role of the States
In the last decade, the political debates over reforming the Mining
Law have contained a good deal of discussion of the role states should play
in regulating hardrock mining on federal lands. All western states now have
regulatory programs that apply to hardrock mining within their borders."
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that state environmental regulations may apply to hardrock mining being conducted on federal land, to the
extent there is no conflict with federal law or regulations.6 7 The NRC
concluded that the overlapping system of federal and state regulation
worked reasonably well, and was "generally well coordinated," although
it did make some suggestions for improvement.'
Nevertheless, the industry advocates for complete federal deference
to state rules. It argues that it can more successfully work with (a cynic
might say dominate) state regulatory authorities. Thus, when the State of
New Mexico sought to require higher bonds from hardrock miners, the
mining companies (led by Phelps Dodge) went to the governor and the state
legislature looking for relief (but so far haven't obtained it).
But these are federal lands, managed to serve national interests.
Federal standards apply to fossil fuel and fertilizer minerals, to timber
harvesting, livestock grazing, and other activities on these lands. There is
no reason to treat hardrock mining differently. Indeed, one very important
fact counsels against federal abdication of regulation to the states: When
regulatory failures happen in hardrock mining, they can be doozies-very
difficult and costly to repair. Moreover, when that happens, as it has several
times in recent years, it is the federal government (i.e., the federal taxpayer)
that usually picks up the bill if the mining company has become insolvent
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and left an inadequate financial assurance. If the feds pay, the feds should
regulate. (This is just a variation of the old maxim that if you want to marry
the federal treasury you're likely to get federal regulation as an in-law.)
Some of the most spectacular modem failures of environmental
regulation of hardrock mining have been state, not federal. The "poster
child" is the infamous Summitville mine, where the State of Colorado's
disastrous decision to approve a poorly-capitalized, badly-located mine
saddled federal taxpayers with a cleanup cost approaching $200 million.'
Skepticism about the ability of the states to stand up to hardrock
miners is also fueled by a consideration of what states have done (and not
done) to regulate extraction of water in connection with mining operations
on federal lands. By longstanding tradition and law, states have substantial
control over water. State regulation of water use in connection with
hardrock mining activities in Nevada, and with the booming coalbed
methane extraction industry in Wyoming, does not inspire confidence. The
State of Nevada, for example, has done almost nothing to regulate massive
water withdrawals at open pit mines within its borders. Groundwater levels
have declined drastically, and the long-term effects (especially when mining
ceases and the giant open pits fill up with water) are not known.' But
history suggests that if serious harm results that will require substantial
expenditures to clean up, proposals will be made to tap the federal treasury.
While it is important that federal law and regulation set a regulatory floor for the conduct of hardrock mining operations on federal land,
state regulatory programs can be tougher than the federal standards. This
was illustrated in the case of the controversial proposed Crown Jewel gold
mine in northern Washington. This proposed mine has been stopped
because the Washington State Pollution Control Hearings Board overruled
the state Department of Ecology's certification that the mine would comply
with state water quality standards. The federal courts, in the meantime, had
rejected environmentalist claims that the federal approval violated NEPA
and other laws." In another example, the voters of the State of Montana,
acting through the initiative process, have outlawed heap leach gold mining
within their borders. The industry is challenging the law in court, but the
Department of the Interior has expressed the view (in the preamble to its
Part 3809 rule revisions) that the Montana law is not preempted.72
IV. THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
As noted at the outset of this essay, the Bush Administration has
paid lip service to the idea of legislative reform. In a carefully worded letter
to the chairs of the authorizing committees of the Congress in October of
2001, Secretary Norton called for reform legislation to update the Mining
Law. She identified five specific features reform legislation should include:
"Permanent authorization of a mining claim holding fee"; "Revision of the
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patent system"; "Authorization of a production payment system";
"Authorization of administrative penalties"; "An expanded role for the
States in managing the mining program."'m In some key respects, the letter
was a masterpiece of obfuscation. For example, what kind of "revisions" in
the "patent system" would the Administration support? Lifting the
moratorium on new patents? The industry approach of continuing to pay
nothing for the minerals, but pay fair market value for the surface? What
kind of "production payment system" would the Administration support?
A meaningful royalty? Or one riddled with loopholes and deductions?
Secretary Norton's letter also spoke favorably of the "existing framework
of the mining claim system." Does this mean the Administration does not
support lifting the limits on the number of mill sites, or abolishing the silly
distinction between lode and placer claims? It appears we won't learn
answers to these questions anytime soon, because the Administration has
no plans to submit its own reform bill to the Congress.
In the Congress itself, the largest political obstacle to achieving
Mining Law reform is this: With few exceptions (mostly eastern and
midwestern members of the House), Republican members of Congress have
marched in lockstep with the industry in opposing meaningful reform. The
Republican Party's near-solid identification with the industry was not
always so; after all, President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s supported
a leasing bill to replace the Mining Law.
The focal point of opposition is in the United States Senate. As a
result of the great constitutional compromise in Philadelphia in 1787,
sparsely populated rural states where hardrock mining occurs (like Alaska,
Idaho and Nevada) have as much sway in the upper body of Congress as
states like New York, California, and Florida. Moreover, the Senate's
internal rules allow unlimited debate unless a super-majority of 60 Senators
votes to cut it off. The mining industry has therefore concentrated its efforts
on securing the support of nearly all of the Senate's 49 Republicans, along
with a few Western Democrats like Harry Reid of Nevada. This coalition
has for more than a decade given the industry in excess of the forty votes
it needs to block reform.
The picture in the House is different. In the committee of jurisdiction, the House Resources Committee, Republican control since the
Gingrich revolution of the fall of 1994 has meant that the committee
chair-first Don Young of Alaska and, more recently, Jim Hansen of
Utah-has been distinctly unfriendly to reform. But supporters of meaningful reform command sufficient votes on the House floor. A core group of
50-75 Republican moderates, mostly from the East and Midwest, have
consistently supported Mining Law reform in recorded votes. That has
provided an ample margin to prevail over the majority of the House
Republicans and the few conservative House Democrats who tend to vote
in support of the industry position. For example, the House voted in 1999
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to endorse the Clinton Administration interpretation of the mill site
provision by a margin of 273 to 151. In June 2001, the House adopted, by a
vote of 216 to 194, an amendment to the Interior appropriations bill
sponsored by Jay Inslee (D. Wash.) and Stephen Horn (R. Cal.) that would
have prevented Secretary Norton from amending the Clinton Administration's 3809 regulations.74 This was significant because the vote was
"whipped" by the House Republican leadership, meaning strenuous efforts
were made to head off Republican defections. Nevertheless, thirty
Republicans voted for it (fourteen Democrats voted against it).
As this glance at the congressional dynamic shows, Mining Law
reform is a relatively cost-free way for members outside the Rocky
Mountain West to cast a green vote. There are also some signs that the
political appeal of Mining Law reform may be growing in the burgeoning
urban areas of the West. Senator Slade Gorton engineered an appropriation
rider that exempted the proposed Crown Jewel mine from the Mill Site
Opinion. The voters of Washington then engineered Senator Gorton's
ouster by a very narrow margin, after a spirited campaign in which his
handling of the Crown Jewel matter became an issue. The only Western
Democrat to oppose the Inslee-Horn amendment was Shelley Berkeley of
Nevada.
Looking to the future of Mining Law reform in the Congress, some
key variables are, first, whether the Administration tries to roll back the Mill
Site Opinion and generously interprets or abandons other claim limitations;
and second, the outcome of litigation filed by environmentalists challenging
the Bush Administration's hardrock mining regulatory rollbacks. If the
courts ultimately side with the environmentalists, the burden will likely
shift to the industry to move curative legislation.
Because the Republicans have retained control of the House in the
recent elections, the industry may get what it wants in the House Committee (where the westerners dominate) but could have problems on the House
floor, where it will likely lack the votes to control the outcome. Although
the Republicans have regained control of the Senate, they may not be able
to deliver for the industry. Mining Law reformers could probably kill an
industry-sponsored bill that lacks sixty votes.
Nick Joe Rahall, a longstanding opponent of the existing law, has
introduced comprehensive reform legislation in the 107th Congress.13 It is
also possible, even likely, that the Mining Law may be reformed piecemeal
by specific measures that address specific problems. For example, Rep.
Mark Udall has introduced a bill that would, among other things, require
mining companies producing from patented and unpatented claims to pay
a reclamation fee, with the proceeds dedicated to abandoned mine land
reclamation. 6 Some reform legislation may take a more indirect course. For
example, Representatives Rahall and Kildee have recently introduced the
Native American Sacred Lands Act (H.R. 5155), which is designed in part
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to reverse the Bush Administration's position that it has no legal authority
to turn down the proposed Glamis Mine because of its impacts on tribal
cultural resources.
V. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS
The hardrock mining industry tended to regard the Clinton
Administration (like the Carter Administration that preceded it) as its worst
nightmare. Secretary of the Interior Babbitt, the industry's bete noire, never
shrank from an opportunity to attack the Mining Law and the special
privileges it gave the industry. He effectively lampooned the patenting
provision with press events and otherwise used his authority effectively to
rein in industry practices and require adherence to details in the law the
industry had been more than happy to ignore or forget.
The industry had long predicted that ending patenting or increasing regulation would strangle the domestic mining industry and send it
rushing abroad. The cry increased as legislative reform efforts drew closer
to success and continued at a loud volume during the Clinton/Babbitt
years.
Yet during this, the industry's worst nightmare, a remarkable thing
happened. Hardrock mining production on federal lands, especially gold,
vastly increased. Starting in the late 1980s, domestic gold production
zoomed to unprecedented levels. It maintained the pace throughout the
Clinton Administration. And this was in the face of a steady decline in gold
prices, from a high of around $850 an ounce in the early 1980s to a low of
$250 an ounce in the late 1990s. By the late 1990s, in fact, the industry was
producing nearly 12,000 ounces of gold per year. The highest previous
levels, less than 5000 ounces per year, were reached in the first two decades
of the twentieth century, and again in the late 1930s. Gold production today
is more than four times greater than it was at the height of the California
Gold Rush, or any other domestic gold rush of the nineteenth century."
Today the United States is the world's second largest producer of gold,
silver, and copper, and the largest producer of molybdenum--all Mining
Law minerals.78
Meanwhile, gold prices have been rising since 9/11, improving
industry's profit margins. For example, gold prices have recently hovered
between $300 and $330 per ounce. Reported cost of production for
Newmont's operating mines in the Carlin trend of Nevada have been in the
neighborhood of $200-220 per ounce.' A rising price means that some
controversial proposals to open new mines, previously held in abeyance,
will likely be resuscitated.
Also during the 1990s, the industry's companion cry-that the
Mining Law was vital to produce minerals of strategic importance in a
hostile world-was undercut by the end of the Cold War, the changing
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economy, and new technologies that reduced dependence on some
minerals. Appreciation also grew that the debate over the Mining Law was
mostly about the production of gold for jewelry. Gold had so little strategic
value that the government actually ordered gold mines shut down during
World War II, so that the workforce could engage in more productive work
elsewhere. All those inconvenient facts have not stopped General Richard
Lawson, formerly the head of the National Mining Association, from
fulminating that changing the Mining Law "will risk the lives of our sons
and daughters, for many will surely die in battle on some foreign shore
because of it."'
Another feature with political ramifications is that, even as
production increased dramatically, the number of jobs did not increase
proportionally. Miners are paid well,"1 but the number of miners continues
to shrink as companies substitute ever larger and more sophisticated
machines for people. Between the early and the mid-1980s, the number of
metal mining jobs in the United States was more than cut in half, from more
than 100,000 to less than 50,000. In the last 15 years, even though domestic
metal production has doubled, the number of jobs in the industry remained
essentially static. Moreover, the industry became ever more concentrated,
now found in only a few states and a few localities. 2 Nevada is responsible
for more than 70 percent of total U.S. gold production, but the state's
mining industry employed only about 10,000 workers in 2001, fewer than
one percent of the jobs in the entire state. In the last decade, the total
number of mining jobs in Nevada has declined even though production
increased.'
Recent national political trends also bolster prospects for Mining
Law reform. Faith in government and governmental regulation is growing.
Corporate responsibility and accountability are fast emerging as major
electoral concerns. And public concern about environmental pollution
remains high, a particularly salient fact because hardrock mining's biggest
impact is on water quality. (Supporters of the Inslee/Horn amendment to
prevent the Bush Administration from rolling back the Clinton
Administration's hardrock regulatory reforms usually invoked concern
about water quality.)
New mine proposals are put forward periodically that train a
spotlight on the antique character of the Mining Law. Media coverage of
such mines helps educate the public and newer members of Congress to the
Law's inadequacies. In the last couple of years, the Rock Creek Mine in
northwestern Montana has served that purpose. The proposed
underground mine would tunnel into a designated wilderness area. The
mine was approved by the Forest Service in December 2001, but the
approval was suspended pending the outcome of biological opinion being
prepared on the proposal in compliance with the Endangered Species Act.
Another mine proposed for federal land near Reno, Nevada, this one for a
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clay substance called montmorillonite (but better known by its popular
name, kitty litter), has attracted controversy. The local county has recently
turned down the company's proposal for a processing facility on private
land the company owns, and the company is considering trying to locate
the processing facility on its mining claims on federal land. The industry
has so far not made the argument that kitty litter is a strategic mineral.
Given the continuing controversy (including a rising tide of local
opposition to mining projects in more urbanized parts of the West), the
increasing difficulty of opening new hardrock mines, and the decline in the
number of jobs at stake and areas affected, one would be forgiven for
wondering how the industry commands the support it does in the Bush
Administration and among the Republicans in the Congress. And one
might also wonder why the will cannot be found to craft environmental and
fiscal reforms that do not seriously threaten substantial investments in
existing mines.
I have pondered those questions for years. There are conventional
explanations. It has not proved easy to mobilize the citizenry about such an
obscure and rather localized issue. The industry seems to make more, and
more effective, political contributions than its opponents, and to spend
much more money on lobbying."' President George W. Bush was a director
of something called the Lucky Chance Mining Company in the mid-1980s,
and his father was an adviser to Barrick Gold, the world's largest gold
mining company.'
Yet these seem too facile. I prefer to believe that the secret to the
Law's staying power is that it stirs deep within us the image of the lone
prospector trudging up the windswept ridge with his burro in tow, eager
to match his wits against mother nature to locate her hidden treasures and
get rich quick. No matter how far that image is removed from the realities
of modem mining-where sophisticated technologies locate deposits and
giant earthmoving machines (and some cyanide) remove them-perhaps
we are just too sentimental to do away with such a romantic symbol of
cupidity and the old West.
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